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CRIMINAL LAW
CHARLES W. DANIELS* AND TERESA E. STORCH**
I. INTRODUCTION
Few cases decided by New Mexico appellate courts during the Survey
year are destined to become landmarks in New Mexico legal history.
Most of the issues presented to the courts during this period dealt with
the finer points of statutory construction, the wording of jury instructions,
and the determination of which offenses were properly presented to the
jury. If one can discern an overall pattern from these appellate decisions,
it would be an expansion of the ranges of sentencing sanctions and crim-
inal charges. The courts also continued to grapple with the issues resulting
from the unfortunate morass created by past encounters With the "prov-
ocation" and "heat of passion" elements of voluntary manslaughter.'
1I. LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
The courts faced several cases this year relating to the propriety of the
submission or refusal to submit lesser included offenses to the jury. Lesser
included offenses often call into play both fairly complex legal analysis
and careful evaluation of the evidence.' The case law in New Mexico
allows an offense that has not been charged to be submitted to the jury
if (1) there is evidence in the record to support a conviction of the charge
and (2) the lesser offense is "necessarily included" in the greater offense
that is charged.3 An offense is considered to be necessarily included when
the greater offense charged in the indictment cannot be committed without
also commiting the lesser offense.4
*Freedman, Boyd & Daniels, P.A.; B.F.A. 1966, University of Arizona; J.D. 1969, University
of New Mexico School of Law; L.L.M. 1973, Georgetown University Law Center.
**Third year student, University of New Mexico School of Law; B.U.S. 1977, University of
New Mexico.
1. Although the entire history of the problem is beyond the scope of this Survey, an excellent
analysis may be found in Professor Romero's recent article. Romero, Sufficiency of Provocation for
Voluntary Manslaughter in New Mexico: Problems in Theory and Practice, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 747
(1982).
2. See 15 A.L.R. 4th 118 (1982).
3. State v. Patterson, 90 N.M. 735, 568 P.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1977).
4. State v. Kraul, 90 N.M. 314, 563 P.2d 108 (Ct. App.); cert. denied, 90 N.M. 637, 567 P.2d
486 (1977). The court held that simple battery was a necessarily included offense within the offense
of battery on a peace officer, because both offenses involve persons, and a peace officer cannot be
battered without his person being battered.
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A good overview of how the courts treat lesser included offense issues
is found in the court of appeals' opinion in State v. Tomlinson.' The
defendant was convicted on three counts of kidnapping and one count of
armed robbery. He appealed to the trial court's refusal to submit to the
jury the lesser included offense of false imprisonment as an alternative
to kidnapping.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court and reaffirmed the holding
of State v. Armijo6 that a kidnapping defendant is entitled to a false
imprisonment instruction when there is evidence indicating his lack of
intent to hold the victim to service.7 In Tomlinson, the court found this
evidence in the defendant's testimony that the co-defendant was the pri-
mary actor and that Tomlinson did not share the co-defendant's intent to
hold the victims to service. Additionally, the court of appeals reasoned
that the trial court erred in refusing to submit the instruction to the jury
because the crime of false imprisonment was necessarily included in
kidnapping, the crime charged in the indictment, and because there was
evidence to support a finding of false imprisonment.8
A slightly more difficult analysis was required in State v. DeMary.9
The defendant was indicted for, inter alia, aggravated battery on his wife
as a result of an incident in which the prosecution contended the defendant
attacked his wife with a butcher knife. Defendant was acquitted of the
aggravated battery charge but was convicted of aggravated assault, an
offense not charged in the original indictment. Defendant appealed the
trial court's submission of that charge to the jury, arguing that it was not
a proper lesser included offense.
The court of appeals agreed with the defendant: for an offense to be
included within another offense, the lesser offense must be necessarily
included within the offense charged.' ° The court relied upon State v.
Kraul" for this proposition. Kraul held that "necessarily included" means
the greater offense cannot be committed without also commiting the lesser
offense. Based upon this rationale, the court held that assault is not
5. 98 N.M. 337, 648 P.2d 795 (Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 98 N.M. 213, 647 P.2d 415
(1982).
6. 90 N.M. 614, 566 P.2d 1152 (Ct. App. 1977). In Armijo, the state argued that false impris-
onment is not necessarily included in the charge of kidnapping because, although false imprisonment
requires the victim to be held against his will, kidnapping by holding to service does not require
that the victim be held against his will. The court of appeals rejected the state's strained reading of
the statute.
7. Kidnapping still may be regarded as an aggravated form of false imprisonment. The defendant
commits kidnapping when, in addition to the act of restraint, he intends to hold the victim in a
condition of involuntary servitude. C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law, § 210 (14th ed. 1979).
8. The court affirmed the armed robbery conviction.
9. 99 N.M. 177, 655 P.2d 1021 (1982).
10. Id. at 179, 655 P.2d at 1023.
11. 90 N.M. 314, 563 P.2d 108 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 637, 567 P.2d 486 (1977).
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necessarily included within battery because the greater offense of battery 2
could be committed without necessarily committing the lesser offense of
assault.' 3 In essence, what the court stated was that battery could be
committed by striking a victim who was unaware that the attack was
about to occur. Further, the court found that the assault instruction sub-
mitted to the jury, requiring the jury to find the victim believed she was
about to be seriously injured or killed, included an element that was not
necessarily included within battery. If the New Mexico definition of lesser
included offenses were always strictly applied, the court of appeals' de-
cision technically was correct. "
The New Mexico Supreme Court, however, reversed the court of ap-
peals in a less technical and perhaps more result-oriented application of
the lesser included offense doctrine. The supreme court held that the
specific elements of each crime must be construed in light of the evidence
in order to determine whether the lesser crime is included in the greater.'"
The supreme court reasoned that it was proper for the trial court to instruct
the jury on aggravated assault because there was evidence in the record
to support a finding that the victim feared the defendant's actions in what
was actually a face to face encounter. The supreme court went beyond a
strict analysis of the elements of the offenses and engaged in an exami-
nation of the particular circumstances of the case. The supreme court
determined that under the particular circumstances in DeMary, aggravated
assault was a necessarily included offense within aggravated battery and,
reversing the court of appeals, reinstated the aggravated assault convic-
tion.
The supreme court's resolution can be both praised and condemned.
On the positive side, the decision achieves what could be considered ajust result under the facts. It is clear from the record that the state could
have charged the defendant with aggravated assault and the evidence in
the record would have justified the jury's finding on that charge. The
negative aspect of the court's opinion, however, is that in achieving rough
justice in this case, the precedent created obscures the previously existing
clear guidelines for application of the lesser included offense doctrine.
12. "The unlawful touching or application of force ... with intent to injure." N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 30-3-5 (1978).
13. The instruction in this case was based on N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3-1(B) (1978), proscribing
conduct which causes the victim to fear a battery.
14. For example, in State v. Duran, 80 N.M. 406, 456 P.2d 880 (Ct. App. 1969), the court held
that battery was an included offense within the offense of aggravated battery. Aggravated battery
must be committed with an intent to injure, and battery must be done in a rude, insolent, or angry
manner to constitute an offense. Although one can commit the greater offense without necessarily
committing it in a rude, insolent, and angry manner, the court of appeals rejected this technical
reading of the statute. See State v. Kraul, 90 N.M. 314, 563 P.2d 108 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90
N.M. 637, 567 P.2d 486 (1977).
15. 99 N.M. at 179, 655 P.2d at 1023 (1982).
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Before DeMary, case law in New Mexico precluded looking to the
evidence in determining whether an offense is necessarily included in a
charged offense. 16 After DeMary, it is unclear how far beyond the statutory
analysis the trial court must go in determining whether a lesser included
offense should be submitted to the jury. The courts probably will be safe
in relying on DeMary to the extent of treating aggravated assault as a
necessarily included offense of aggravated battery, but to attempt to apply
its unclear reasoning beyond that situation risks the creation of reversible
error.
In State v. Gonzales,'7 the court of appeals also addressed the factual
circumstances that might justify the submission of a simple battery in-
struction as a lesser included offense of battery upon a peace officer.
Gonzales was convicted of battery on a police officer and appealed the
trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on simple battery as a lesser
included offense. An examination of the statutes involved makes it clear
that one cannot commit the offense of battery on a peace officer without
also committing simple battery.' 8 Therefore, the court did not have to
face the conceptual statutory construction problems involved in DeMary
and Tomlinson. Instead, Gonzales required the court to address the other
problem recurrent in lesser included offense situations, the factual deter-
mination of whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to justify
submitting the lesser offense to the jury. 9
The factual inquiry in Gonzales addressed the requirement that the
officer be performing his duties in order to make the offense a battery
16. See State v. Alderete, 91 N.M. 373, 574 P.2d 592 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 491,
576 P.2d 297 (1978) (indicating that attempted trafficking of heroin is not necessarily included in
the offense of trafficking); State v. Patterson, 90 N.M. 735, 568 P.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding
that aggravated assault is not included in assault with intent to kill); and State v. Trujillo, 85 N.M.
208, 510 P.2d 1079 (Ct. App. 1973) (holding that driving under the influence of intoxicants is not
included in vehicular homicide).
17. 97 N.M. 607, 642 P.2d 210 (Ct. App. 1982).
18. "Battery is the unlawful, intentional touching or application of force to the person of another,
when done in a rude, insolent or angry manner." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3-4 (1978). "Battery upon
a peace officer is the unlawful, intentional touching or application of force to the person of a peace
officer while he is in the lawful discharge of his duties, when done in a rude, insolent or angry
manner." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-24 (1978).
19. From a purely theoretical point of view, it could be argued that a crime determined to be a
necessarily included offense under an analysis of the elements of the statutes always could be
submitted without resort to the factual analysis exemplified by Gonzales. The state always has the
burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and because a verdict
cannot be directed against the defendant on any single one of those elements, a jury is free to find
against the prosecution on those elements that elevate an offense from the lesser included offense
to the greater offense charged, notwithstanding the judge's view of the weight of the evidence or
the absence of evidence to challenge the state's position on the differentiating elements. The courts,
however, have not taken that approach. Instead, they require the defense to point to evidence that
the judge believes would be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of reasonable jurors
on those differentiating elements which elevate the lesser offense to the greater. Gonzales is an
example of that approach.
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upon a peace officer.2 ° The record in Gonzales contained evidence that
an officer investigating a bar fight punched the defendant in the face.
Although the officer claimed he struck the defendant first because he felt
the defendant was about to strike him, the defendant's testimony was to
the contrary. The court found that the defendant's testimony gave rise to
an issue of the use of excessive force by the police officer and noted that
excessive force is not part of the performance of the duties of the police
officer.21 The court concluded that the defendant was entitled to his re-
quested instruction on simple battery as a lesser included offense because
there was a factual issue as to whether the officer was performing his
duties.22
III. VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
The courts grappled this year, perhaps inevitably, with the legacy cre-
ated by State v. Trujillo23 and Smith v. State.24 Those cases and their
progeny25 hold that it is error for a court to submit to the jury an instruction
on voluntary manslaughter when the facts establish either first or second
degree murder, but are not sufficient to support a finding beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of the voluntary manslaughter elements of provocation,
heat of passion, or sudden quarrel. The net result of this doctrine is that
the elements of voluntary manslaughter intended to mitigate the offense
20. The statute requires that the officer be in the "lawful discharge of his duties," but the approved
instruction on peace officer battery, N.M. UJI. Crim. 22.10, is the result of some statutory rewriting
by the Jury Instruction Committee. The instruction does not require that the officer be in the "lawful
discharge of his duties," but, on the theory that the issue of lawfulness is generally a question of
law to be decided by the judge, requires only that the peace officer be performing his duties. State
v. Rhea, 93 N.M. 478, 601 P.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1979), had previously approved this statutory
modification in the jury instructions in dictum.
21. 97 N.M. at 609, 642 P.2d at 212 (Ct. App. 1982). The court's opinion indicates that when
an officer uses excessive force, he or she is acting outside the scope of his or her duties and therefore
is acting as any other citizen. The logical extension of this reasoning would extend the "defense of
another" defense to a defendant who intervenes on behalf of a third person who is the victim of
excessive police force. At the present, the court recognizes that a defendant has a limited right only
if acting in self-defense against a police officer using excessive force. State v. Kraul, 90 N.M. 314,
563 P.2d 108 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 637, 567 P.2d 486 (1977).
22. The court's opinion did not involve the issue of whether there is a right to use necessary
force in resisting an unlawful arrest. Although New Mexico traditionally has held that a citizen does
have such a right, see, e.g., State v. Kuykendall, 37 N.M. 135, 19 P.2d 744 (1933), recent cases
have cast some doubt on both the existence and scope of that right. See State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100,
583 P.2d 464 (1978) and State v. Kraul, 90 N.M. 314, 563 P.2d 108 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90
N.M. 637, 567 P.2d 486 (1977). Both Gonzales and its predecessor, State v. Melendrez, 91 N.M.
259, 572 P.2d 1267 (Ct. App. 1977), clearly stand for the proposition, however, that one has a right
to defend oneself against the use of excessive force in making an arrest.
23. 27 N.M. 594, 203 P. 846 (1921).
24. 89 N.M. 770, 558 P.2d 39 (1976).
25. See, e.g, State v. Martinez, 95 N.M. 421, 622 P.2d 1041 (1981); State v. Aubrey, 91 N.M.
1, 569 P.2d 411 (1977); State v. King, 90 N.M. 377, 563 P.2d 1170 (Ct. App. 1977); State v. Reed,
39 N.M. 44, 39 P.2d 1005 (1934); State v. Hunt, 30 N.M. 273, 231 P. 703 (1924).
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from the premeditated or "cold blooded" homicide offenses have become
affirmative requirements that the prosecution must prove in order to sus-
tain a voluntary manslaughter conviction.
The most severe problems created by this doctrine arise when the
defendant is being prosecuted for murder, and a lesser included offense
instruction on voluntary manslaughter is either submitted or refused. If
it is submitted and the defendant is found guilty of manslaughter the
defendant may be set free by the appellate courts upon a determination
that the record shows an intentional killing but does not contain sufficient
evidence of provocation to sustain a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.
On the other hand, if the defendant's request to have voluntary man-
slaughter instructions submitted to the jury is denied and he is convicted
of a greater offense, the appellate court may reverse the conviction if it
determines that there was evidence tending to support a finding of prov-
ocation.26
Not only does this result create a terrible dilemma for trial judges in
their efforts to determine whether to submit a voluntary manslaughter
instruction to the jury, but it leads to unfortunate consequences in the
administration of criminal justice. One consequence is that most trial
courts probably will refuse defendant's request to have a voluntary man-
slaughter instruction submitted to the jury. This refusal will save the
appellate courts from having to choose to turn a murderer free in the
event that a voluntary manslaughter instruction was submitted improperly.
As a further consequence, however, the defendant and the criminal justice
system may be burdened with an unnecessary appeal and retrial in the
event that the appellate court later determines that the trial court should
have submitted the instruction. Nonetheless, preventing a murderer from
being released may be perceived by the trial court as the safest way to
resolve the matter.
Another unfortunate consequence of treating the provocation element
as an affirmative element of voluntary manslaughter, rather than a miti-
gating factor in homicide, is that it creates a gap in the coverage of the
homicide statutory scheme. The gap arises in the situation where there
is evidence sufficient to support a finding of either provocation or no
provocation. This evidence may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt
that defendant is guilty of murder, but it is not enough to sustain a
conviction of voluntary manslaughter.
This year, the appellate courts were faced with appeals in which trial
courts had both granted and denied the voluntary manslaughter instruc-
tion. In State v. Martinez,27 the defendant relied on State v. Smith in his
26. See, e.g., State v. Ulibarri, 67 N.M. 336, 355 P.2d 275 (1960).
27. 97 N.M. 540, 641 P.2d 1087 (1982).
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claim that there was insufficient evidence of provocation to justify his
conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Martinez was charged with murder
in the shooting death of a state policeman. The court of appeals affirmed
the conviction by finding sufficient evidence of provocation.
In reaching this result, the court was forced to distinguish the unfor-
tunate precedent of State v. Manus.2" Manus also involved a defendant
who killed a police officer and was charged with murder. The defendant
requested a voluntary manslaughter instruction on the grounds that the
officer provoked the defendant's actions. The trial court denied the re-
quested instructions, and the supreme court affirmed. The Manus court
stated that as a matter of law, "[aicts of a peace officer exercising his
duties in a lawful manner cannot rise to the level of sufficient provoca-
tion. "29
The Martinez court, faced with the combination of Manus and Smith,
had to search the record to find evidence of unlawful conduct on the part
of the officer sufficient to support a jury finding of provocation. The
evidence relied upon by the court was testimony that there had been
previous confrontations between defendant and the officer. The confron-
tations implicitly involved some unlawful conduct on the part of the
officer. At the scene of the killing, the officer had dragged the defendant
out of his truck and pushed him up against the truck after the defendant
refused to get out voluntarily. The court, in a result-oriented opinion,
affirmed the conviction stating there was sufficient evidence to support
the conviction on voluntary manslaughter.
The supreme court addressed the issue of whether words could con-
stitute provocation for voluntary manslaughter in State v. Sells.30 Sells
was convicted of second degree murder for the shooting of his wife. At
trial, the jury was instructed on first and second degree murder and
involuntary manslaughter, but the trial court denied the defendant's re-
quested instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The court of appeals af-
firmed the conviction on the basis of the Trujillo-Smith line of authority,
because it found insufficient evidence of provocation to justify submitting
voluntary manslaughter to the jury. The court felt bound by the holding
of the New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Farris,3 which presented
a situation quite similar to that in Sells. In both cases, the defendants
28. 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979).
29. Id. at 100, 597 P.2d at 285. The Manus holding, requiring not only that the acts provoking
the defendant be sufficient to provoke a reasonable person into acting emotionally but that they be
"unlawful" acts in order to mitigate a murder offense to manslaughter, has been analyzed and soundly
criticized in Romero, Sufficiency of Provocation for Voluntary Manslaughter in New Mexico: Prob-
lems in Theory and Practice, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 747 (1982). The Manus decision is destined to lead
to confusion and anomalous results in future decisions.
30. 98 N.M. 786, 653 P.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1982).
31. 95 N.M. 96, 619 P.2d 541 (1980).
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shot their wives after their wives made statements concerning men with
whom they were having affairs. Farris upheld the refusal of a trial judge
to submit voluntary manslaughter to the jury on the court's belief that
words can never be sufficient provocation.32
In Sells, however, the supreme court granted certiorari, reexamined its
decision in Farris, and reversed the court of appeals. The court noted
that a strict reading of Farris would never allow words to be the factual
basis for manslaughter provocation. Although holding to the view that
insulting words are never sufficient provocation,33 the court adopted the
long-repeated distinction that informational words, as distinguished from
merely insulting words, may constitute adequate provocation.34 The court
noted that a sudden disclosure of an event that would provide adequate
provocation may be the equivalent of the event presently occurring.35 To
the extent that Farris and other New Mexico cases indicated that infor-
mational words could not be sufficient provocation, the Sells opinion
expressly overruled them.
The Sells court seemed to be moving away from mechanical and rigid
formulae for determining what may or may not be sufficient provocation
under the statute. If this is the direction in which the court is moving, it
is a good move. Attempting to define in advance the specific fact situations
that will or will not justify a jury in finding that the defendant was
reasonably provoked robs the jury of its function as the fact finder and
creates confusion and difficulty in future cases. Perhaps the same result
will be reached by the court when the Manus decision is reconsidered in
the future.
IV. CRIMINAL INTENT
The consequences of labeling a crime a strict liability offense are
exemplified in State v. Lucero.3 6 The crime involved was child abuse. A
number of cases, beginning with State v. Lucero (hereinafter Lucero I),37
have held that the New Mexico child abuse statute3" is a strict liability
statute dispensing with the traditional element of criminal intent. Lucero
I was based on the language of the statute that provided, "[a]buse of a
child consists of a person knowingly, intentionally or negligently, and
without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to be: (1) placed
32. Id. at 97, 619 P.2d at 542.
33. 98 N.M. at 787, 653 P.2d at 163 (1982).
34. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 76 (1972).
35. Sells fatally shot his wife at about 5 a.m. Late the night before and up to the time of the
shooting, they had been arguing about Mrs. Sells' boyfriend. Sells had learned that night for the
first time of his wife's long-standing marital infidelity. 98 N.M. at 786-87, 653 P.2d at 162-63.
36. 98 N.M. 204, 647 P.2d 406 (1982).
37. 87 N.M. 242, 531 P.2d 1215 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 239, 531 P.2d 1212 (1975).
38. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-6-1 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health; or (2) tortured,
cruelly confined or cruelly punished. . . . ," Lucero I and subsequent
cases have construed the statute to be a strict liability statute on the basis
of the use of the word "negligently" in the statute.' ° For example, in
State v. Fuentes,41 the court of appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to
give a mistake of fact instruction. The reasoning underlying the decision
was that (a) mistake of fact is a defense when it negates the existence of
the mental state essential to the crime charged, (b) defendant's mental
state is not essential to the crime of child abuse, and (c) mistake of fact
is not a defense to a charge of child abuse.42
This year, the court used similar reasoning to hold that duress is not
a defense to the crime of child abuse. In State v. Lucero (hereinafter
Lucero JI),43 the trial court ruled inadmissible the testimony of a psy-
chologist stating that the defendant did not seek help for her abused child
because she was afraid of her boyfriend, the person who committed the
physical abuse. The court of appeals reversed the defendant's conviction
because of the failure to allow the testimony relating to the duress defense,
but the New Mexico Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. The rea-
soning of the supreme court was that (a) duress is "an act committed
under compulsion, such as apprehension of serious and immediate bodily
harm, is involuntary and, therefore, not criminal,"' (b) apprehension is
a mental state, and (c) the child abuse statute imposes strict liability and
punishment without regard to the mental state of the defendant.
The reasoning in the Fuentes-Lucero H line of cases is troubling. It
appears that once the courts determine child abuse to be a strict liability
crime, the language of the statute is no longer important, despite the fact
that it was the language of the statute that originally justified this cate-
gorization. Both the statutory language and a jury instruction tracking
it45 submit to the jury the question of whether the defendant "knowingly,
intentionally, or negligently" permitted a child to be endangered or abused.
Two of these three terms clearly relate to intentional acts. If the jury is
going to consider these elements of the offense as contained in a jury
instruction, then it should also be permitted to consider the defenses of
39. Id. § 30-6-1(C) (1978) (emphasis added).
40. See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 88 N.M. 448, 541 P.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1975); State v. Fuentes,
91 N.M. 554, 577 P.2d 452 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 610, 577 P.2d 1256 (1978) State
v. Coe, 92 N.M. 320, 587 P.2d 973 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 353, 588 P.2d 554 (1978).
41. 91 N.M. 554, 577 P.2d 452 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 610, 577 P.2d 1256 (1978).
42. Fuentes also indicated in dictum the court's view that refusal of a mistake of fact instruction
might never be reversible error because the standard instructions on the requirement of criminal
intent would seem to include the defense. Id. at 557, 577 P.2d at 455.
43. 98 N.M. 204, 647 P.2d 406 (1982).
44. Id. at 206, 647 P.2d at 408.
45. See State v. Robinson, 93 N.M. 340, 345, 600 P.2d 286, 291 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92
N.M. 532, 591 P.2d 286 (1979); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-6-1 (1978).
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duress and mistake of fact.6 Moreover, it would seem that the statute
does not eliminate completely an inquiry into the mental state of the
defendant; it merely allows the jury to base a conviction on a finding of
one of the three states of mind.
Strange results will continue from the problems created by Lucero I,
in declaring the child abuse statute to be a strict liability offense, and by
Fuentes and Lucero II, in removing the normal defenses that relate to
the mental state of the defendant. One would assume, for example, that
insanity would be determined to be unavailable as a defense in a case of
child abuse based upon the same reasoning as provided in Fuentes and
Lucero II.
Notwithstanding the New Mexico courts' interpretation of the child
abuse statute, when the prosecution submits the case to the jury on know-
ingly and intentionally endangering or abusing a child, there is logically
no reason why the defendant should not be entitled to present evidence
and have the benefit of instructions on traditional defenses relating to
those two states of mind.47 In cases where the prosecution submits the
negligence element to the jury, there is no reason the usual defenses to
crimes involving criminal negligence should not be allowed.4"
This term, the New Mexico Supreme Court faced once again the mean-
ing of the term "depraved mind" in the first degree murder statute. "9 In
State v. Sena,5" the defendant was convicted of first degree murder based
on a "depraved mind" theory. The defendant attempted to shoot and kill
the doorman at a bar after an altercation. The defendant shot at the
doorman several times, but instead killed an innocent bystander. The
defendant's argument on appeal was that the evidence supported a verdict
based on transferred intent to kill.1 Defendant admitted that he specifically
intended to kill the doorman. He claimed, however, that because the
depraved mind theory "has been limited to reckless acts and disregard
of human life in general as opposed to the deliberate intention to kill one
46. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law §28 (1972).
47. Id. at 201.
48. Although Lucero I held that simple, or tort, negligence was all that was required under the
statute, there is nothing in the statute to indicate that the word "negligently" in a criminal statute
means anything other than criminal negligence. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-6-1 (1978).
49. "Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by another without lawful
justification or excuse ... (3) by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a
depraved mind regardless of human life." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
50. 99 N.M. 272, 657 P.2d 128 (1983).
51. "Murder is the unlawful killing of one human being by another with malice aforethought,
either express or implied ...perpetrated ...(5) from a deliberate and premeditated design un-
lawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-1 (1978).
The statute has now been amended to exclude a specific reference to the transferred intent theory,
although it clearly will continue to be a basis for a first degree murder conviction. Id. (Cum. Supp.
1983).
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particular person, ",52 his intent to kill the doorman removed him from the
scope of the depraved mind statute.
The supreme court rejected the argument, and construed the depraved
mind statutory language more broadly. The court held that "Sena's act,
regardless of his specific intent to kill the doorman, was greatly dangerous
to the lives of others and indicated a depraved mind without regard for
human life." 53 The result is sensible and avoids a hypertechnical and
unjust result.
V. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
Prior to the enactment in 1972 of the Controlled Substances Act, 4 the
criminal laws relating to controlled substances were found in several
different parts of the statutes; one area was the Drug and Cosmetic Act. 5
The recent case of State v. Reams56 addressed problems caused by over-
lapping coverage of these two acts. The defendants were charged with
unlawful distribution of a controlled substance (quaalude) in violation of
the Controlled Substances Act.57 The state appealed the district court's
dismissal of the charges; the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal and
the supreme court reversed.
Reams presented a difficult issue because of the overlapping coverage
of the two statutes. Both statutes purported to declare the possession or
sale of quaalude to be a criminal offense. The Controlled Substances Act
penalty provision5" made the crime a third degree felony. The Drug and
Cosmetic Act penalty, however, was a petty misdemeanor.59 The case
thus presented the recurring problem of determining which of two ap-
parently applicable statutes controlled.' ° The law in New Mexico is that
where two statutes treat the same subject matter, the more specific of the
two statutes will be construed to prevail over the statute with the more
general terms and broader scope."
Although the foregoing principle is simple to state, it is often much
52. See State v. DeSantos, 89 N.M. 458, 461, 553 P.2d 1265, 1268 (1976).
53. 99 N.M. at 274, 657 P.2d at 130 (1982).
54. The Act has been codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-31-1 to 30-31-40 (Repl. Pamp. 1980).
55. Now codified as N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 26-1-1 to 26-1-26 (1978).
56. 98 N.M. 372, 648 P.2d 1185 (Ct. App. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 98 N.M. 215,
647 P.2d 417 (1982).
57. "Except as authorized by the Controlled Substances Act [30-3 1-1 to 30-31-40 NMSA 1978],
it is unlawful for any person to intentionally distribute or possess with intent to distribute a controlled
substance. ... N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-22(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1980).
58. Id. § 30-31-22.
59. Id. § 26-1-26(B).
60. See State v. Lujan, 76 N.M. I I1, 412 P.2d 405 (1966); State v. Blevins, 40 N.M. 367, 60
P.2d 208 (1936); State v. Alderete, 88 N.M. 150, 538 P.2d 422 (Ct. App. 1975).
61. State v. Blevins, 40 N.M. 367, 60 P.2d 208 (1936).
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more difficult to apply. Reams exemplifies that difficulty. The majority
of the court of appeals determined that because the Drug and Cosmetic
Act was more specific in terms of its regulatory provisions applicable to
methaqualone than the Controlled Substances Act, the former act ap-
plied.62 On certiorari, the supreme court reversed and adopted by reference
the dissenting opinion of Judge Wood. That opinion concluded that the
Controlled Substances Act was both more comprehensive and more spe-
cific in dealing with the controlled substances falling within its coverage.63
Moreover, Judge Wood specifically held that the Drug and Cosmetic Act
applies only when the Controlled Substances Act does not apply.6 It is
clear, therefore, that a charge under the Controlled Substances Act cannot
be dismissed on the ground that the Drug and Cosmetic Act covers the
same offense.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
State v. Norush65 addressed the meaning of the ex post facto prohibition
under the New Mexico Constitution and case law. The defendants were
convicted for escape from the penitentiary. At the time of the offenses,
the supreme court in Esquibel v. State66 had specifically held that the
duress defense stated in New Mexico Uniform Jury Instruction--Criminal
41.20 was a defense to the charge of escape from the penitentiary.67 By
the time Norush was tried, however, the duress defense to a charge of
escape from the penitentiary had been substantially limited by a modi-
fication of the uniform jury instruction.68
By its terms, the ex post facto clause of the New Mexico Constitution69
applies only to state legislative enactment of ex post facto laws. The New
Mexico courts, however, traditionally have held that the state constitu-
tional prohibition on legislative enactments equally applies to judicial
rulemaking.7° The court of appeals in Norush concluded that the change
62. 98 N.M. at 376, 648 P.2d at 1189.
63. Id. at 378, 648 P.2d at 1191.
64. Id.
65. 97 N.M. 660, 642 P.2d 1119 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 50, 644 P.2d 1039 (1982).
66. 91 N.M. 498, 576 P.2d 1129 (1978).
67. "Evidence has been presented that the defendant was forced to... [describe acts of defendant]
under threats. If the defendant feared great bodily harm to himself or another person if he did not
commit the crime and if a reasonable person would have acted in the same way under the circum-
stances, you must find the defendant not guilty." Use Note I states: "For use when duress is a
defense to any crime except homicide, [or] a crime requiring an intent to kill ... "
68. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.20 and 41.22. The significant change is that the Use Note makes 41.20
inapplicable to escape from the penitentiary. N.M. U.JI. Crim. 41.22 is a duress defense instruction
specifically for escape from the penitentiary.
69. "No ex post facto law ... shall be enacted by the legislature." N.M. Const. art. II, § 19.
70. Marquez v. Wylie, 78 N.M. 544, 434 P.2d 69 (1967); State v. DeBaca, 90 N.M. 806, 568
P.2d 1252 (Ct. App. 1977). For federal treatment of this issue, see Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 347 (1964) and Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
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in the duress instruction deprived defendants of the duress defense avail-
able at the time of their escape and was prohibited as ex post facto.7
In reaching its result, the court of appeals addressed the state's argument
that the court was powerless to hold the jury instruction mandated by the
supreme court inapplicable. The order of the supreme court mandating
the use of the new instruction provided that the change "shall apply to
criminal cases filed in the district courts on or after July 1, 1980. "72 The
court of appeals noted that the prosecution originally had filed the in-
dictment in Norush in December of 1979, and then dismissed in August
of 1980 because of irregularities in the grand jury proceedings. The exact
same charge again was filed by information in October of 1980.
In a holding noteworthy for its potential application to future cases,
the court of appeals held that the dismissal and refiling did not bring the
case under the new rule that became effective after the original filing.
73
The court held that the state may not rely upon prosecutorial errors,
whether by the grand jury or by the prosecutor assisting the grand jury,
in attempting to take advantage of the change in the law. That reasoning
would seem to apply with full force to cases involving the application of
article IV, section 34 of the New Mexico Constitution, which provides
"[n]o act of the legislature shall affect the right or remedy of either party,
or change the rules of evidence or procedure, in any pending case."
74
The courts have construed that provision to apply both to court rules
75
and to changes in the law (although not technically expostfacto) occurring
after the case has been filed in a court.76 Whether the courts will apply
the Norush holding to future changes where a case is filed, dismissed
because of some fault of the prosecution or grand jury, and then refiled
after a change in procedure or evidence that may not rise to the level of
an ex post facto law, is an open question.
In State v. Sandoval,77 the defendant was convicted of prostitution and
claimed on appeal that the prostitution statute 71 violated the equal rights
amendment and equal protection clause of the New Mexico Constitution,79
as well as the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution."0
71. The Norush court noted that it was immaterial whether the change be categorized as a
procedural change or a change in substantive law, so long as the change operated to deny to the
accused the defense available under the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense.
97 N.M. at 662, 642 P.2d at 1121.
72. Id. at 664, 642 P.2d at 1123.
73. Id.
74. N.M. Const. art. IV, § 34.
75. State v. DeBaca, 90 N.M. 806, 568 P.2d 1252 (Ct. App. 1977).
76. Gray v. Armijo, 70 N.M. 245, 372 P.2d 821 (1962); 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-10.
77. 98 N.M. 417, 649 P.2d 485 (Ct. App. 1982).
78. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-2 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
79. "No person shall . . . be denied equal protection of the laws. Equality of rights under law
shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person." N.M. Const. art. II, § 18.
80. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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The defendant argued that because the prostitution statute makes multiple
offenses of the prostitute a misdemeanor, whereas the patron statute1
makes multiple convictions a petty misdemeanor, the statutes discriminate
against women. The court noted that both statutes were gender neutral
on their face and conceivably could apply to both male and female pros-
titutes and patrons, allowing for the prosecution of either sex under either
statute. The court also upheld the power of the Legislature to set different
criminal penalties for different criminal activities.
If the Sandoval court meant that the defendant could not complain
about different treatment of male and female patrons, there is no occasion
to disagree with the statement. If, however, the court was addressing the
defendant's argument that female prostitutes and male patrons are treated
in a manner that violates equal protection or the equal rights amendment,
the court's position is troublesome. The court's decision seems to imply
that an independent ground for rejection of a selective enforcement ar-
gument is that the defendant is not charged under the statute which she
claims is not enforced against the class of persons who benefit from the
discriminatory selective enforcement scheme.82
VII. MISCELLANEOUS STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONS
In State v. Martinez, 8 3 the supreme court upheld a conviction of criminal
sexual penetration in the second degree. The court decided the statutory
requirement that the sexual penetration be perpetrated "in the commission
of any other felony"' applies to the situation where a burglar commits
a rape while on the premises. The defendant argued that because the
crime of burglary technically is complete when there is an unauthorized
entry with the requisite intent,85 the burglary was completed once he
entered the dwelling, and the rape which occurred after entry was not
"in the commission" of the burglary. The court rejected the argument
and held the statutory language should be applied in the same manner as
identical language appearing in the felony murder statute.86 The courts
have interpreted the felony murder statute as meaning that if a homicide
occurs within the res gestae of a felony, it is immaterial whether the
homicide occurred before or after the actual commission of the felony,
81. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-3 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
82. The Sandoval court also held that the defendant had no standing to complain of unequal
enforcement of the patronizing statute because she was not charged with or convicted of an offense
under that statute. 98 N.M. at 419, 649 P.2d at 487.
83. 98 N.M. 27, 644 P.2d 541 (Ct. App. 1982).
84. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-11(B)(4) (1978).
85. State v. Madrid, 83 N.M. 603, 495 P.2d 383 (Ct. App. 1972); State v. Ford, 81 N.M. 556,
469 P.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1970).
86. 98 N.M. at 30, 644 P.2d at 544 (Ct. App. 1982).
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so long as the two acts were part of one continuous event and closely
connected in time, place, and causal connection.87 The court's result,
although not as capable of precise application as the technical position
taken by the defendant, is a common sense application of the obvious
legislative intent.
An analogous issue was presented in State v. Luna.88 The defendant
was convicted of aggravated burglary, which creates a more serious cat-
egory of the crime of burglary when the defendant, "after entering, arms
himself with a deadly weapon."89 In Luna, the defendants burglarized a
store and stole a number of unloaded rifles and pistols. They argued on
appeal that they had not "armed" themselves simply by stealing unloaded
weapons. The court held that it was immaterial whether the firearms were
loaded or unloaded,' and took note of the fearful and hazardous situation
created by the appearance of an apparently armed burglar.
Although it is not altogether clear from the opinion, the court appears
to equate "arms" with "possesses"; the intention of the defendant to
employ the firearm as a weapon may be immaterial.9 The court observed
that whether a defendant is in actual possession of a firearm within the
contemplation of the statute or possesses the requisite criminal intent is
still a matter for proof at the trial. This language leaves open the possibility
of the defense that the firearm was not available for use as a weapon,
even though technically it was in the possession of the defendant, similar
to a firearm in a locked container. The opinion also may leave open the
argument that the defendant did not intend to arm himself, but merely
intended to steal the firearm as a part of the loot, although this latter
interpretation seems highly unlikely in light of the earlier analysis.92
State v. Willis93 raised the question of whether a viable fetus is a person
under the New Mexico vehicular homicide statute." The defendant was
indicted and charged with vehicular homicide for the death of an unborn,
viable fetus. The state appealed the district court's dismissal of the in-
dictment, and the court of appeals upheld the dismissal, holding that a
87. See, e.g., State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321 (1977); State v. Flowers, 83 N.M.
113, 489 P.2d 178 (1971).
88. 99 N.M. 76, 653 P.2d 1222 (Ct. App. 1982).
89. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-4(B) (1978).
90. The court relied in part on N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-12(B) (1978) which defines a "deadly
weapon" to include "any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded."
91. 99 N.M. at 78, 653 P.2d at 1244 (1982).
92. Defendants moved to dismiss during the trial on the grounds that possession of unloaded
firearms did not mean "armed" within the contemplation of the statute, and that the prosecution
failed to prove their intention to use the weapons because the weapons were unloaded and part of
the loot. They did not affirmatively argue a lack of intent to arm themselves. Id. at 77, 653 P.2d at
1223.
93. 98 N.M. 771, 652 P.2d 1222 (Ct. App. 1982).
94. N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-8-101 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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fetus is not a person for purposes of the statute. 95 In arriving at this
conclusion, the court relied on the recognized principle that any statutory
ambiguity in a penal statute must be strictly construed against the state. 96
The court observed that this was an issue of first impression in New
Mexico and that all jurisdictions which had addressed the issue had held
that the homicide statutes of their respective states did not apply to a
viable fetus.97 The court found this position to be in keeping with the
common law position and the apparent legislative intent in New Mexico.
From 1853 to 1963, the New Mexico homicide statute distinguished
between killing a human being and killing a fetus. In 1963, the Legislature
repealed the statute relating to the killing of an unborn infant child. The
court correctly concluded that to include a fetus within the scope of the
homicide statute would be both inconsistent with the legislative history
and a violation of the ex post facto protections of the New Mexico
Constitution."
Spousal immunity under the New Mexico escape statute99 was exam-
ined in State v. Mobbley. "oo Mobbley was charged with knowingly har-
boring or aiding a man named Needham, who was attempting to avoid
arrest. Needham and Mobbley's husband were hiding in her house when
police officers with felony warrants arrived at the house to look for the
wanted men. Mobbley lied by telling the officers the two men were not
at the premises. The police officers heard noises inside during the course
of the conversation with Mobbley, and entered the house and arrested the
two men.
The district court dismissed the charge stating Mobbley was exempt
from punishment by the wording of the statute.' 01 The prosecutor had
stipulated that Mobbley could not have revealed the presence of Needham
without also revealing the presence of her husband. The district court
concluded that she could not be prosecuted under the statute and dismissed
the information.
95. 98 N.M. at 775, 652 P.2d at 1226 (Ct. App. 1982).
96. See State v. Ortiz, 78 N.M. 507, 433 P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1967).
97. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970),
People v. Green, 79 I11. 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916 (La.
1979).
98. The court did not address the question of the extent to which the Legislature could impose
criminal penalties for killing a fetus. The issues involved in such a statute obviously would be
intertwined with the complex constitutional issues raised by abortion statutes. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
99. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-22-4 (1978).
100. 98 N.M. 557, 650 P.2d 841 (Ct. App. 1982).
101. "Harboring or aiding a felon consists of any person, not standing in the relation of husband
or wife, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, brother or sister by consanguinity or affinity,
who knowingly conceals any offender or gives such offender any other aid, knowing that he has
committed a felony, with the intent that he escape or avoid arrest, trial, conviction or punishment."
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-4 (1978).
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The court of appeals reversed. The court looked to the common law
and legislative history of the statutory exemption. The statute is an out-
growth of the common law of accessories after the fact,"°2 and the ex-
emption apparently is justified on the ground that it is unrealistic to expect
persons to be deterred from giving aid to their close relatives.'0 3 The
court emphasized, however, that Mobbley was not charged with harboring
her husband, but was charged with harboring Needham. The court rec-
ognized that the defendant faced a dilemma. If she had answered truth-
fully, she would have revealed the presence of her husband. If she had
lied, she would have incurred the risk of prosecution. Nevertheless, the
court held that it would be improper for the courts to expand the exemption
created by the statute. In dictum, the court observed that "at a trial a jury
could properly determine . . . that defendant lacked the requisite statutory
intent to aid Needham. ""
In this type of situation, the proper inquiry is the intent of the defendant:
if the intent was to aid both her husband and the accomplice, she can be
punished for harboring the accomplice, but not for harboring her husband.
On the other hand, if her intent in lying to the officers merely was to
assist her husband, without concern for the consequences to the ac-
complice, the exemption apparently will apply. Although the court's hold-
ing makes the fact finder's task of determining the defendant's true intent
more difficult, it probably is in keeping with the meaning of the statute.
VIII. SENTENCING
The recent popularity of various enhancement schemes in the statutes
has created a great deal of litigation. In State v. Johnston,05 the court
reaffirmed earlier interpretations"° of the firearm enhancement statute. 107
The defendant was given four firearm enhancements on various sentences
he received for offenses arising from two armed robberies. One of the
related burglary sentences was enhanced because defendant was armed
with a firearm when he entered the house. Defendant argued that he had
not "used" the firearm, as required by the statute, but was merely carrying
it. The court rejected the argument, citing the earlier case of State v.
Trujillo, "'08 which held that "use" includes the menacing display or striking
102. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law §66 (1972).
103. Id.
104. 98 N.M. at 558, 650 P.2d at 842 (Ct. App. 1982).
105. 98 N.M. 92, 645 P.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1982).
106. State v. Trujillo, 91 N.M. 641, 578 P.2d 342 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 751, 580
P.2d 972 (1978); State v. Gonzales, 95 N.M. 636, 624 P.2d 1033 (Ct. App.), overruled on other
grounds sub nom. Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 701, 634 P.2d 1244, 1253 (1981); State v.
Kendall, 90 N.M. 236, 561 P.2d 935 (Ct. App.), modified, 90 N.M. 191, 561 P.2d 464 (1977).
107. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-16 (1978).
108. 91 N.M. 641, 578 P.2d 342 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d 972 (1978).
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of a victim with the gun, regardless of whether the gun actually was used
as a firearm."0
The court also rejected Johnston's argument that the aggravated degrees
of the burglary and robbery crimes of which he was convicted were, in
effect, already enhanced because they were committed with a deadly
weapon. The Johnston court relied on its holding in State v. Gonzales"'
that the firearm enhancement could be added to the basic sentence of
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, even though the weapon pro-
vides both the basis for the firearm enhancement and the increased severity
of the basic sentence.
Finally, the defendant argued unsuccessfully that the crimes actually
were one continuing event, and that it was improper to impose four
separate firearm enhancements for one continuous use of the firearm. The
court again relied on an earlier case, State v. Kendall,"' which upheld
enhancing the sentences for all crimes committed with the use of a firearm.
The Johnston opinion reflects the general approach of the New Mexico
appellate courts to apply the enhancement statutes to their fullest extent."'
State v. Reaves"3 follows the same trend. Reaves was convicted of
aggravated assault. "' In addition, the jury found that he had used a firearm
in the commission of the crime. His basic sentence of eighteen months"5
for aggravated assault was enhanced by one year pursuant to the firearm
enhancement statute. " 6 The defendant also was found to be an habitual
offender and his sentence was further enhanced by another year in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the habitual offender statute." 7 The de-
fendant argued on appeal that once the basic sentence is enhanced by the
firearm provision, it is no longer a "basic" sentence capable of enhance-
ment under the habitual offender statute. ' The court held that the various
sentencing enhancements serve different purposes and the statutory lan-
guage indicates a legislative intent to apply them cumulatively.
109. Compare State v. Chouinard, 93 N.M. 634, 603 P.2d 744 (Ct. App. 1979) in which the
court recognized a distinction between "use" and "possession," holding the enhancement inappli-
cable where a firearm was found to have been concealed on the person of the defendant after his
arrest for distribution of cocaine. The court held that mere possession, without display or further
use in the commission of the crime, was not "use" within the meaning of the statute.
110. 95 N.M. 636, 624 P.2d 1033 (Ct. App.), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Buzbee v.
Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 701, 634 P.2d 1244, 1253 (1981).
111. 90 N.M. 236, 561 P.2d 935 (Ct. App.), modified, 90 N.M. 191, 561 P.2d 404 (1977).
112. Other courts have taken different approaches. See, e.g., Busic v. United States, 446 U.S.
398 (1980) (if the defendant is charged under a statute which already authorizes enhancement the
sentence may not be further enhanced by another enhancement provision).
113. 99 N.M. 73, 653 P.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1982).
114. The statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3-2 (1978), elevates an assault from a petty misdemeanor
to a felony when the assault is committed "with a deadly weapon."
115. Id. §31-18-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
116. Id. §31-18-16(A).
117. Id. §31-18-17(B).
118. Id. Section 31-18-17 provides that a convicted offender with one previous felony shall have
"his basic sentence" increased by one year, without possibility of suspension or deferment.
[Vol. 14
CRIMINAL LAW
A separate enhancement provision was involved in State v. Wilson. 119
As part of the new determinate sentencing scheme, the Legislature pro-
vided that the basic sentence could be increased by a factor of up to one-
third if the court finds the existence of "aggravating circumstances." 20
The defendant was convicted of aggravated battery; the aggravating factor
under the battery statute was the use of a gun. At sentencing, the trial
court added one year to the basic sentence of three years, finding the use
of the firearm to be the aggravating circumstance. The court of appeals
reversed this sentence because the language of the statute specifically
excludes the consideration of the use of a firearm as an aggravating
circumstance. This subject is covered in the separate firearm enhancement
statute. 21
On remand, the trial court resentenced the defendant to the same term,
this time finding aggravatilng circumstances in the deliberate and planned
nature of the attack. Again the defendant appealed, claiming that the
charge of aggravated battery includes the element of an intent to injure,
and there were no aggravating circumstances beyond the elements of the
offense that would justify an enhancement of the statute: The court of
appeals this time upheld the sentence, distinguishing between an element
of the crime and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime. '22 The court found the facts that the defendant lay in wait for the
victim, that her actions were deliberate, and that defendant's statement
to the victim just before she fired indicated an intent to inflict serious
injury justified the finding of aggravating circumstances.' 23
The court in Wilson also rejected the defendant's double jeopardy
argument that the circumstances were used twice to enhance her sentence;
first to raise the aggravated battery from a misdemeanor to a felony and
second to increase the sentence for aggravating circumstances. The court
held there was no double jeopardy in considering the circumstances sur-
rounding the felony when determining whether the basic sentence should
be enhanced because there was only one offense involved: the felony of
aggravated battery. ,24
119. 97 N.M. 534, 641 P.2d 1081, cert. denied, 98 N.M. 50, 644 P.2d 1039 (1982).
120. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-18-15.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
121. Id. §31-18-16.
122. 97 N.M. at 538, 641 P.2d at 1085.
123. The court quoted the statement of the defendant in which she told the probation office the
circumstances of the confrontation with the victim:
I said, 'Did you get a good piece of ass tonight.' He said, 'No I didn't.' Then
I said, 'Well I'm really sorry because it'll probably be your last.' Then I pulled
my gun out and shot him.
Id. at 537, 641 P.2d at 1084.
124. A recent decision of the court of appeals, State v. Mead, 100 N.M. 27, 665 P.2d 289 (Ct.
App. 1983), has held the "aggravating circumstances" enhancement unconstitutional for lack of
guidelines. The supreme court has granted certiorari and at the time of this writing, the case had
not been decided.
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Finally, the court of appeals construed the victim restitution statute.25
in a manner that would provide for maximum use of the restitution policies'26
embodied in the statute. In State v. Gross, '27 the defendant was convicted
of embezzlement. He was sentenced to the basic term of three years,
with the mandatory two year parole term, and fined the maximum $5,000. 128
In addition, the court ordered the defendant to make full restitution to
the victims. The defendant appealed the restitution order, arguing that it
was not authorized under the victim restitution statute. That statute spe-
cifically states that "[i]f the trial court exercises either of the sentencing
options under Section 31-20-6 NMSA 1978 [the suspension and deferment
provisions], the court shall require as a condition of probation or parole"
a plan of victim restitution.' 29 The defendant argued that the victim res-
titution order was unauthorized because the trial court had imposed the
penitentiary term and had not deferred or suspended any part of the
sentence.
The court of appeals rejected the argument, construing the statute to
reflect a legislative policy of requiring each violator to make restitution.
One potential problem created by this result is that if restitution is required
as a condition of the mandatory two year parole to be served after im-
prisonment for the maximum term allowed under the statute, the defendant
could remain in prison for an additional two years beyond the maximum
set by the statute because of his failure or refusal to make restitution.' 3
125. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-17-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
126. "It is the policy of this state that restitution be made by each violator of the Criminal Code
of New Mexico to the victims of his criminal activities .... This section shall be interpreted and
administered to effectuate this policy .... " Id. § 31-17-1(A).
127. 98 N.M. 309, 648 P.2d 348 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
128. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-18-15(B)-(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
129. Id. §31-17-1(B).
130. The imprisonment of a defendant for his inability to make restitution, as opposed to his
refusal, raises equal protection problems. It is a violation of equal protection to incarcerate a defendant
for his inability to pay a fine. See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois,
399 U.S. 235 (1970); Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1972).
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